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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 9689-82
30 November 1982MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: [] A/NIO/NESA

SUBJECT: Highlights of State Conference on Iran, 29 November 1982

1. State Department hosted a seminar on Iran attended by several leading academic specialists and government experts on 29 November.
2. The conference agreed on the following judgments:
 - The clerics are effectively consolidating their hold on power, gaining experience and expertise. The Islamic Republic will outlast Khomeini's death. The clerics are institutionalizing their position and retain lower class support. There is no sign of a change in regimes in the foreseeable future.
 - Khomeini will not compromise on his demand for Saddam Husayn's overthrow and will continue the war.
 - The Soviets have not made appreciable gains in Iran since the revolution and are not likely to do so in the near term. The Tudeh Party is not capable of playing a major role in Iranian affairs at this time. Moscow-Tehran relations are strained by Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war and the Tudeh crackdown. Iran is not likely to turn to the USSR for arms; it will prefer to keep its sources diversified.
 - US-Iranian relations will not improve as long as Khomeini lives. Anti-Americanism runs deep in Iran and is being passed on to the young.

All participants also agreed that US policy for now should emphasize a cautious approach. The consensus favored a non-activist policy that monitors developments closely but avoids deep involvement in Iranian

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politics. Indirect contacts should be maintained but we should not give Khomeini the impression the US is courting his favor either.

3. There was some disagreement over the likely future development of events in Iraq. Some participants foresaw Saddam's overthrow within the next 6-9 months while others believe he can still hold onto power. Some of the academics disagreed with the Community's view that Iran is not likely to make a major breakthrough on the battlefield this winter because of logistical constraints. In general, however, there was agreement that the war is going against Baghdad and that an Iranian victory would be detrimental to US interests.

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State Dept. review completed